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SUMMARY:

Whether a shareholder's derivative action

-

under §36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 is exempt from

---

the director demand requirement of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23.1.
2.

FACTS & PROCEEDINGS:

Resp, a minority shareholder in a

money market fund, instituted this derivative action under §36(b)
~

(
\

u.s.c. §80a-35(b), ,.-:-~ ~--~- c.~ ~ - ~ ~ - ~tu--c_{
~L ~ ~~ .&oto t.--r~ :r~~

of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15

~~~-

R~

against petrs (the fund and its investment advisor) to recover
allegedly excessive advisory fees.

No demand was made by the

resp on the directors of the fund.

Petrs therefore moved to

dismiss the action for failure by resp to comply with the

_____

director
demand requirement of Rule 23.1, 1 and that motion was
....___
granted by the District Court.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that Rule
23.1 does not apply to actions brought under §36(b).

C J1 '2-

The court

reasoned that §36(b) actions are not derivative because an
investment company does not itself possess the right to bring an
action against its advisor for return of allegedly excessive
fees.

I

The Rule 23.1 demand requirement applies only when a

corporation has "failed to enforce a right which may properly be

/

(

asserted by it."

-----.,

Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23.1.

Thus, if the fund

may not sue pursuant to §36(b), no demand upon its board of

directors is required.

The second sentence of §36(b) states that

an action may be brought only "by the [Securities and Exchange]
Commission, or

b ~ecu_: ii;Y

holde s of [a] registered investment

1 The demand requirement of Rule 23.1 provides:
"The
complaint shall also allege with part1cularitythe efforts, if
any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from
the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the
shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to
obtain the action or for not making the effort." The requirement
finds its origin in Equity Rule 94, 104 U.S. IX (1882), which
adopted the Court's holding in Hgwes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450
(1881), that "before the shareh~der is perm1tted in his own name
to institute and conduct a litigation which usually belongs to
the corporation, he should show to the satisfaction of the court
that he has exhausted all the means within his reach to obtain,
within the corporation itself, the redress of his grievances, or
action in conformity to his wishes." 104 u.s., at 460-461.

company on behalf of such company."
company is authorized.

No action by the investment

The legislative history of the Act

indicates that the relationship of a fund to its investment
advisor makes it "a part of the problem in a way that precludes
it from being part of the solution" and hence the investment
company was not intended to possess a right of action under
§36(b).

In addition, the board of directors of an investment

company, unlike the boards in other derivative suits, have no
power to terminate a §36(b) action.

Finally, the delay caused by

the director demand process may have the untoward result of
precluding full recovery of excessive fees while the directors
determine whether they had acted against the interest of
shareholders, because §36(b) expressly limits recovery to

(

(

excessive fees paid up to one year prior to the commencement of
suit.

Thus, for the above reasons, in the context of a §36(b)

law suit, the director demand requirement would be "an empty,
unfruitful and dilitory exercise."
3.

CONTENTIONS:

The decision below creates a conflict

between the circuits, involves an important and unsettled
------------~

question of federal law, and is erroneous.

The decision below

conflicts directly with Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115 (CA 1),
cert. denied, 103 s.ct. 85, No. 81-2361 (1982), and Weiss v.
Temporary Investment Fund, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.,
Nov. 12, 1982. 2

~98,

865 (CA 3)

The First and Third Circuits rejected every

2 These opinions are reproduced in the Appendix to
Petition.

argument relied on by the Court of Appeals below, and held that a
I
(

demand on the directors is required in a shareholder's action
brought under §36(b).
In view of the oversight role with respect to advisory fee s
which Congress gave to the unaffiliated directors of an
investment company, the policy of exhaustion of intracorporate
remedies has especially clear application to shareholders'
derivative actions brouqht under §36(b).

If the directors find

the shareholders' claim has merit, they can negotiate with the
advisor to obtain a return of fees, terminate the contract if th
advisor refuses, or institute a

~36(b)

action.

The court erred in construing Congress' silence on an
implied corporate right of action as indicating an intent to
deprive an investment company of the right to bring such an
action.

An implied corporate right of action would further the

purpose of the Act.

In addition, the state of the law at the

~

time Congress enacted §36(b) constitutes a background against
which Congress should be presumed to have known that an
investment company had its own right of action against its
advisor.

s.ct.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 102

~
~~

1825 (1982).

Even if an investment company does not have a right of
action under §36(b), a shareholder's action under that
is still derivative and

~~

mu~t

~~

provision~

be preceded by a director demand.

The statute authorizes shareholders to bring an action against an
investment advisor "on behalf of" an investment company; this
language clearly makes a shareholder's action derivative.

,

Burkes

v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477
"derivative."

(1979), referred to §36 (b) suits as

Id., at 484.

Resp acknowledges the Circuit Court conflict, but maintains
that it is not of sufficient importance to warrant review because
the director cannot terminate an action brought under §36(b).
Moreover, the decision below is correct because where express
remedies are created in some detail, as in §36(b), there should
be no additional implied rights of action.

The Court's holding

in Burkes v. Lasker that a §36(b) action may not be terminated by
a court simply because the board of directors urge it to do so
reflects Congress' feeling that reliance on the board was
ineffective in checking excessive advisory fees.

Resp also notes

that this circuit conflict was present when the Court denied
(

(

rehearing in Grossman v. Fidelity Municipal Bond Fund, supra, on
January 10, 1983.
4.

DISCUSSION:

There is a direct conflict between the

decision below and the decisions reached by the First and Third
Circuits.

The Second Circuit in this case noted that its

decision conflicted with that of CA 1 in Grossman, and CA 3 noted
in Weiss that its decision conflicted with that of the Second
Circuit in this case.

No conflict existed when the Court denied

cert in Grossman and the petition for rehearing was untimely.

As

the parties' contentions indicate, there are strong arguments on
both sides of the issue.

If there is serious question about

whether the conflict is sufficiently important in terms of the
federal statute to justify review, the views of the Solicitor
General could be requested.

In light of the direct conflict

involving three decisions rendered in 1982, and on a subject
which would appear to be the source of much litigation in the
future, I recommend a GRANT.

I see no jurisdictional problem;

only one question is presented.
There is a response.
February 16, 1983
ME
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
Daily Income Fund v. Fox
No. 82-1200
November 5, 1983

David A. Charny
Question Presented

Whether a shareholder who brings suit to challenge
advisory fees under section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act,
15

u.s.c.

§

80a-35(b), must first make demand upon the company's

board of directors.
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I. Background
A. Statutory Background
The Investment Company Act of 1940, now codified at 15

u.s.c.

§

80a-l et seq., was passed to regulate widespread abuses

in the investment company industry.

Investment companies are

generally organized by another entity which appoints the board of
directors and contracts with the company to manage its assets and
to sell its shares.

The 1940 Act was aimed at the grosser forms

of its abuse which this structure permitted: dealing of the
managers with corporate assets on terms unfair to the company;
fraud in the sales of shares; excessive issuance of debt; and
outright theft.

The Act required registration of securities,

limited companies' debt, required that directors otherwise
unaffiliated with the company or its investment adviser sit on
the board, and restricted transactions between the company and
persons "affiliated" with it.
With the growth of investment companies after 1940,
problems arose from more subtle conflicts of interest regarding
compensation for services provided to the investment company
brokerage commissions, sales loads, and advisory fees.

The

--------~

present suit involves determination of advisory fees.

These fees

were generally a fixed proportion of the total assets of the
company.

As companies grew, so did the total fee, although the

costs of providing advisory services vary little with the size
the company.

Although fees arrangements that might originally

have been reasonable later became excessive, the board of
directors did not re-negotiate the contract because it was

dominated by the advisor.

~~

Shareholder suits were ineffective

because of the stringent standards for proving "waste" of
corporate assets.

·

~

~
~~

*

11'7~
~~~~~~

The 1970 amendments to section 36 of the Investment
Company Act, 15

u.s.c.

§

80a-35(b}, aimed at this problem.

The

)

amendments stipulated that the investment adviser had a fiduciary
......
______....
duty with respect of receipt of compensation and authorized
shareholders or the SEC to sue investment advisors to recover
excessive fees for the corporation.

This case raises the

question whether the shareholder must demand action from the

~

company directors before brining suit under this section.
B. Facts and Proceedings Below
Resp, a shareholder in petr Daily Income Fund, an
investment company, brought suit against petr Reich & Tang, Inc,
petr Fund's investment adviser.

The suit, brought on behalf on

the Fund under section 36(b} of the Investment Company Act of
1940, 15

u.s.c.

§

80a-35(b}, alleged that Reich & Tang had

charged excessive fee for its advisory services.

Reich & Tang's

fee was set at one-half of one percent of the Fund's net assets.
Assets increased from $75 million in 1978 to $775 million in
1981; and the investment advisory fees increassed from $375,000
to $3,875,000.

The complaint alleged that the work done by Reich

& Tang for the company had not changed during this period.
Resp did not make any demand upon the Fund's

directors.~)

The DC dismissed for failure to comply with the demand
requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.

After reviewing the

purposes of Investment Company Act, the DC noted that demand on

~'A••""'-

the directors would permit them to seek redress without resort to
litigation or to institute a suit themselves.

Further, the

statute should be construed to harmonize with the Federal Rules
if possible, and the court found no evidence in the legislative
history that a demand requirement woud interfere with the
regulation of investment advisory fees.

Finally, the court noted

that the Act provided that director approval of advisory fees
"shall be given such consideration by the court as is deemed
appropraite under all the circumstances." 15
35{b) {2).

u.s.c.

§

80a-

A demand requirement would provide an opportunity for

such deliberation.

The DC then found that failure to make demand

upon the fund's directors could not excused in the circumstances
of this case.
The CA 2 {Judge Kaufman writing for Judges Friendly and
. b erg ) reverse d •
Fe1n

.
. d on 1 y 1. f t h e
Not1ng
t h at rule 2 3 .1 app 1 1e

/-'.4~
~/9~~

shareholder suit sought to enforce a right which could be
asserted by the corporation itself, theCA held that section

~~

~

36{a) did not create a cause of action for the investment fund to
recover fees.

The language of the statute contained no

suggestion of such a cause of action, and the legislative history
confirmed that a corporate right of action was not contemplated
because Congress considered that the investment fund's directors
were too closely tied to the investment adviser to be expected to
prosecute a suit for recovery of excessive fees.

Finally, the

court noted that its conclusion was consistent with the policies
of section 36{b).

A demand requirement would unjustifiably delay

suit and thereby preclude complete recovery, and would serve

little purpose because the directors could not decide to bring
suit themselves and could not decide to 'terminate the suit.
The decision of the CA 2 is in conflict with those in
Grossman v. Johnson 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir. 1982), and Weiss v.
Temporary Investment Fund, 692 F.2d 928 (3rd. Cir. 1982).
II. Discussion
A. Substantive Requirements of Rule 23.1
The government initially suggests that rule 23.1 is only

7

a rule of pleading and imposes no substantive requirement that a
demand be made.

Therefore, the question in this case should

properly be posed as whether the common law rule requiring demand
will be imported into these derivative actions.
While the terms of Rule 23.1 might be read to impose
only a requirement that the plaintiff plead with particularity
whatever demand he chooses to make upon the directors, the lower
courts have consistently interpreted the rule to impose a
.. I

substantive requirement that the plaintiff carry an initial

bu~~emonstrat[ing]
doing their duty."

why the directors are incapable

of~
~.,...~44

Heit v. Bird, 567 F.2d 1157 (1st Cir. 1977): ~

In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 263 (1st Cir.

~

C~c,L

1973): Brody v. Chemical Bank, 482 F.2d 1111, 1113-1114 (2d
1973).

Cir.~

In contrast, rule 23.l's requirement that plaintiffs

make~

demand "if necessary" upon the shareholders or members has been
interpreted to require demand only if required by the relevant

~tate

or federal substantive law.

See

~ody,

supra, at 1114: 7A

vfwright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, at§ 1832.
This distinction between demand on shareholders and directors

suggests that courts have deliberately construed the rule 23.1
requirement of demand on directors as a 'requirement imposed
directly by federal law, not simply adopted by reference to law
that provides the basis for the shareholders cause of action.

v"'"

The Court's discussion of the rule in Cohen v.
Beneficial Loan Corp., 337

u.s.

541, 556 (1949) also implies that

the rule embodies a direct requirement that demand be made.

~r

The

r'l:ri'e construes the rule to require that the plaintiff "set forth
the facts showing that the plaintiff has endeavored to obtain his
remedy through the corporation itself."

The Court went on to

note that the provision so construed "neither create[s] nor
exempt[s] from liabilities

"

Contrary to the government's

submission on this issue, the demand requirement does not detract
from any substantive right of the plaintiff.

It merely requires

that if a plaintiff wishes to bring an action in federal court
which may properly be brought by the corporation itself, the
plaintiff must first show good reason that the corporation itself
would not be expected to bring the action.
Thus, the courts below correctly assume that a suit
under section 36(b) is derivative and therefore triggers the rule
23.1 demand requirement unless the section 36(b) accomplishes an
~ ~

implied repeal of rule 23.1.

Further, even if section 36(b) is

~~ot ~rivative, Congress may have intended that a demand

~~uirement be enforced in this cause of action to enforce the
~ policies behind the Act.

~

..

,

I shall consider these points in turn.

B. Applicability of Rule 23.1
Whether section 36 (b) creates oy· implication a cause of
action for the corporation is a question of congressional intent.
Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
(1979} •

u.s.

11, 15-16

~ ~

It seems clear that Congress did not create such a

remedy here.

I~

First, while section 36(b} explicitly creates

rights of sction on the part of the SEC and individual security
holders, it gives absolutely no indication that the corporation
has a right of action.

As the Court has frequently observed,

clear contrary evidence of legislative intent is required to
overcome the presumption that the express provision by Congress
for one remedy precludes implication of other remedies by the
courts.

See National RR Passenger Corp. v. National Assn of RR

Passengers (Amtrak}, 414

u.s.

453, 458 (1974}; Middlesex County

Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453

u.s.

1,

14-15 (1981}; Texas Indust. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S.
630, 640 n.ll (1981}.

Further, it is particularly remarkable

that Congress did not include any reference to suit by the
investment company itself or of derivative suits by shareholders
enforcing the company's rights, because, as the SG notes, earlier
drafts of the law contained such provisions.

SG Brief at 18-19.

Nor is there any mention of a demand requirement of the
statute itself.

Although Congress expressly indicated that

approval of the contract by the board of directors of an
investment company "shall he given such consideration by the
court as is deemed appropriate,"

15

u.s.c.

§

80a-35(b} (2}, the

statute contains absolutely no intimation that Congress expected

/

' .v-

that some action by the Board of director would be forth corning
before a suit was filed under the Act.
Petrs concede, as did the courts of appeals which found
that there was an implied right of action in the company, that
there is no explicit indication in the legislative history of
intent to create this right.

See Weiss, 692 F.2d, at 935.

Rather, the courts contend that the legislative silence indicates
that "Congress did not intend to restrict company's right to
sue."

Id.; Grossman, 694 F.2d at 120.

First, it is contended

that Congress meant to preserve the pre-1970 law, under which
there was a common law action for corporate waste under the law
of the states, and an implied derivative right of action under
section 36.
1971).

E.g., Moses v. Burgin,

445 F.2d 369 (1st. Cir.

Second, given the requirement that suit must be brought

"on behalf of the investment company," "it was unnecessary to say
with particularity that the company" had a statutory cause of
action.

A suit on behalf of the company .•• is normally a

derivative action that the company could itself bring."
The first argument relies upon the holding of Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456

u.s.

353,

~~

381-382~

(1982) that when Congress "left intact the statutory provisions
under which the federal courts had implied a cause of action,"
Congress intended to "preserve" that cause of action.

Whatever

the merits of this argument, compare id., at 408 (JUSTICE POWELL,
dissenting)

(theory is "inconsistent with the theory and

structure of our constituitonal government"), it is inapplicable
to the present case.

'

''

Unlike the provision at issue in Merrill

·'·

Lynch, section 36(b) is not "left intact" from previous
legislation; it is totally new.
Further, Congress expressly indicated that it did not
consider that section 36(b) codified the implied derivative
action of such cases as Moses v. Burgin, which had relied on the
language now in section 36(a), but created a distinct right.
"Although section 36(b) provides for an equitable action for
breach of fiduciary duty as does section 36(a), the fact that
subsection (b) specifically provides for private right of action
should not be read by implication to affect subsecton (a)."
Rep. 91-184, at 16 (1969).

S.

Section 36(b) creates and provides

for enforcment of a specific fiduciary duty on the part of
investment advisors with respect to compensation, in contrast to
the general duties of officers addressed by old section 36, and
present section 36(a), of the Act.

Id. at 6-7.

Thus, Congress

considered section 36(b) provides for suit to enforce a right of
the corporation not previously recognized either in state law or
in the private cause of action for misconduct of corporate
officers under old rule 36.
Finally, the section 36(b) action would not be
derivative of the state law cause of action for waste.

The terms

of rule 23.1, as well as the purposes behind the demand
requirement, strongly suggest that a shareholder suit is
ll

derivative when the shareholder seeks to enforce the :same
right
=;;;:;;---

-

"

as the corporation itself could enforce if it chose to bring suit
after demand was made.

The suggestion of amicus Investment

Company Institute to the contrary, see Amicus Br. ·at 10, is

..

unsupported by the cases.

Further, the legislative history

condemns state law suits as inadequate to vindicate the company's
interests because of the stringent requirements for proof of
"waste."

Sees. Rep., at 5.

It would therefore be particularly

anomalous in this case to consider the shareholder's federal
cause of action derivative of that provided to the corporation
under state law.
The Act's use of the phrase "on behalf of such company,"
does suggest a congressional understanding that the suit is
derivative.

Although the CA below argued that the phrase

indicated only that the plaintiff must "seek return of excessive
management fees to the company treasury and not to individual or
governmental coffers," it seems natural to assume that, if the
corporation has the right to receive this recovery, it has a
right to sue for it on its own behalf.
Although this point is troubling, petr's argument seems
to mistake the limits on the exercise of federal court
jurisdiction and the corresponding requirements for creation of
the cause of action.

While section 36(b) well may indicate that

Congress recognized that the investment company had a right not
to pay excessive fees, this recognition does not resolve the
question whether Congress intended to open the federal courts to
suits by the company asserting this right require prior demand
upon directors.

As noted above, section 36(b) creates a distinct

right, and there is no indication that Congress intended this
right to be enforced in any way but those specifically provided
by that section.

Given the care with which Congress indicates

that it is creating a new cause of action with respect to a new
federally-created right, it seems anomalous that Congress
intended the corporation itself did bring suit for the right in
federal court, but simply assumed that this was so obvious that
it would neither provide a basis for jurisdiction or for the
cause of action in the relevant section.
C. Policy Arguments Concerning a Demand Requirement
Even if Congress did not create a right of action for
which section 36(b) is derivative, Congress might have intended
that a demand requirement be imposed in order to further the
purposes of the Act.

The CA below correctly determined however {

that on balance the demand requirement woud hinder rather than
--~--

..

~

aid effective enforcement of section 36(b).

•
~~ ~
The primary purpose of the demand requirement is ~~

permit the corporation itself to control litigation purportedly
conducted on its behalf.

Hawes v. Oakland, 104

u.s.

450, 460-461

(1882): Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder
Derivative Actions, 44 U Chi L. Rev. 168, 171 (1976).

"[T]he

focus at the demand stage should be on the issue of whether the
corporation may take over the suit and either prosecute it or
adopt other internal corrective measures ••.• At the demand stage,
the possibility should not be foreclosed that a demand will
induce the board to consider issues and crystallize policies
which otherwise might not be given attention .•.• "ALI
Restatement on Principles of Corporate Governance and Structures
~

§

7.02, at 270-271 (1982).

.

----y

As a matter of policy, whether to impose a demand
requirement in the present case depends ' upon competing views of
the role of the board of directors.

On the one hand, as the CA 3

emphasized, Congress in 1970 intended to "enhance the
independence of directors and their responsibility for advisory
fees."

It did so by expanding the class of those "interested

persons," id. §80a-2(19)

(previously termed "affiliated persons")

who can constitute no more than 60% of the investment company
board of directors. 15

u.s.c.

§ 80a-10.

Congress retained the

provisions of the 1940 Act which required that contracts with
advisers be approved annually by a vote of the board of directors
(or of the shareholders), id., § 80a-15(a) (2), and be terminable
by a vote of the board with six days' notice to the adviser, id.,
par. (3).

Congress clearly intended that the board undertake an

active role in supervising fees paid to advisers.

A demand

requirement might help the board fulfill this responsibility.

If

a shareholder made demand upon the board, the board might obviate
the need for suit by insisting that the investment adviser either
refund the excessive payments or have his contract terminated.
On the other hand, the board's power to control the suit
is limited.

The board does not have the power to terminate the

suit, see Burks v. Lasker, 441

u.s.

471, 484 (1979)

(construing

section 36(b) (2)), and, as argued above, cannot bring suit
itself.

(If it could, the shareholder suit would be derivative

and the present discussion would be superfluous.)

Further, the

legislative history seems to indicate, contrary to the assumption
of the CA 3, that Congress did not expect that the board would

not use the measures available to it to curb advisory fee abuses.
The basic outlines of the regulations ori the board of directors
were in place with the 1940, and Congress found that these had
not effectively checked the specific problems at which the 1970
amendments were addressed.

s.

Rep. No. 91-184, at 6.

Indeed,

the provisions of the 1940 had not been intended to do so, as
they were aimed at "unfair capital strucures and ••• dishonest
securities transactions with insiders" rather than "managerial
compensation."

H. Rep. No. 2337, at 66 (1966)

(Report of the SEC

on Investment Company Growth).
Further, Congress did not think of the 1970 reforms that
strengthened the independence of the Board as solutions to the
conflict of interest regarding managerial compensation.

Neither

the House nor the Senate reports make any connection between the
changes in the definition "interested persons" and the problem of
management fees.

Indeed, while the Senate report gives great

emphasis to the provision for shareholder suits, it does not even
mention the "interested persons" requirement in its summary
discussion of the bill.

Sees. Rep., at 5-13.

And the

legislative history indicates that the board was not thought to
be free, as a practical matter, to terminate established
management relationships when differences arose over
compensation.

For that reason, "even a requirement that all of

the directors of an externally managed investment company be
persons unaffiliated with the company's adviser-underwriter would
not be an effective check on advisory fees and other forms of
management compensation."

H. Rep. No. 2337, at 148.

If

I

conflicts of interest make "arms-length bargaining between the
unaffiliated irectors and the managers

. · .~wholly

unrealistic" in

the first instance, id., it is difficult to see why Congress
would have expected the boards more effectively to protect the
company's interests once a demand has been made upon the board.
Nowhere does the legislative history indicate that
Congress explicitly considered whether the board might be
responsive to a shareholder demand made in anticipation of suit.
Such demand might spur effective action at least in a few cases.
But because the investment advisors' contract must be approved
every year after the first two years, any demand for suit will
follow closely upon a decision by the board that the contract was
in the best interests

oft

the corporation.

Further, as theCA 2

observed, the one-year statute of limitations on recoveries,

u.s.c.

§

15

80a-35(b) (3) means that delay while the demand is

considered prevents the company from fully recovering excessive
profits.
Thus, the advantages of the demand requirement in this
context are not so apparent that the Court should construe the
provision that the shareholder sues "on behalf of" the company,
or section 36(b) as a whole, to require demand upon the board.

I

do not think that Congress simply assumed that the courts would
impose such a requirement as a matter of course.

Where Congress

has wished to impose a demand requirement for shareholder suits
created by statute, it has explicitly imposed such a requirement.
See 15

u.s.c.

§

78p(b)

(shareholder suing to recover insider

"short swing" profits for the corporation only "if the issuer

shall fail or refuse to bring such suit ••• after request .•• ").
'

.

Particularly where Congress, in creating a shareholder cause of
action, .h as addressed in detail such matters as the appropriate
~

parties, the limits on recovery, the weight to be given to the
board of directors vote, and the power of the board of director
to terminate the suit, it seems unlikely that Congress would
leave the demand requirement to be inferred by judicial
construction.
III. Conclusion
Because the section 36(b) shareholder action is not
derivative, section 23.1 does not require that the shareholder
'~------~-

make demand upon the board before bringing suit.

Nor do the

terms of section 36{b) indicate that Congress intended directly
to impose such a requirement.
below should be affirmed •

.

~

For these reasons, the judgment
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MEMO TO FILE:
This

memo,

bench memo, merely

dictated

without

the

benefit

of

a

summarizes my tentative view at this

time.
The

case

is an

a

interesting one:

derivative

action brought by respondent, a shareholder in petitioner
money market fund,

under §36(b) of the Investment Company

-

Act of 1940.

Although the fund was a named defendant, the

principal defendant was its investment adviser whose fees
had

soared

in

excess

of

$2

The

million.

suit

was

to

recover excessiver advisory fees as authorized by §36(b).

directors
suit.

No

demand

of

the

was

fund

made

prior

to

by

respondent

bringing

the

on

the

derivative

On a motion to dismiss for this reason, the DC held

that the plaintiff
demand

on

the

(respondent here) had failed to make a

fund

as

required

by

Rule

23.1.

CA2

reversed, holding that Rule 23.1 does not apply to actions
brought

under

Investment
purpose

§36(b).

Company
of

That

Act

authorizing

investment advisers.

in

section
1970

was

added

specifically

stockholder

suits

to

the

for

the

against

In pertinent part §36(b) provides:

"An action may be brought under this subsection
by the Commission, or by a security holder • . .
on
behalf
of
such
company,
against
such
investment adviser • . . or any other person . .
• who has a fiduciary duty •
. for breach of
[that] fiduciary duty in respect to compensation
or payments paid
to such investment
adviser."

Rule 23.1 that normally requires a demand on the
board of directors, was held by CA2 not to be applicable
in view of the express language of §36(b).
Siting my opinion in Sea Clammers, CA2 declined
to

infer

a

private

right

of

action

by

the

investment

company itself:
provided
~peci f ic--!,nd
rov1s1ons,
and entrusted
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
their use to part1cu ar partrcular parties, we
will not lightly assume an unexpressed intention
to
create
additional
ones".
(citing
Sea
Clammers) .
There

was,
by

at
the

the

time

First

of

the

Circuit:

CA2

suit,

contrary

decision

Johnson.

CA2 rejected CAl's reasoning in Grossman.

Grossman

a
v.

Since

CA2's decision, however, CA3 has agreed with CAl.
My tentative view is that CA2 is correct:
no

~·

t

private

cause of

action may be

inferred

against

that
the

fund,

and

therefore Rule 23.1 with respect to demand

inapplicable.

L.F.P., Jr.
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[January-, 1984]

......., ~

delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision is whether Rule 23.1 of the Fed- L.-z._. ~
eral Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an investment ~ &....,
company security holder first make a demand upon the company's board of directors before bringing an action under /.2 ~'-< ~ v
§ 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA or Act)
to recover allegedly excessive fees paid by the company to its
investment adviser. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held in this case that the demand requirement of Rule
23.1 does not apply to such actions. Fox v. Reich & Tang,
Inc., 692 F. 2d 250 (CA2 1982). Two other Courts of Appeals have reached a contrary conclusion. 1 We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, - - U. S. - - (1983), and now
affirm.
JUSTICE BRENNAN

j

I

Respondent is a shareholder of petitioner Daily Income
Fund, Inc. ("Fund"), an open-end diversified management investment company, or "mutual fund," regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("ICA" or "Act"), 15 U. S. C.
§ 80a-l et seq. The Fund invests in a portfolio of short-term
money market instruments with the aim of achieving high
'Weiss v. Temporary Investment Fund, Inc., 692 F. 2d 928 (CA3 1982),
cert. pending, No. 82-1592; Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F. 2d 115 (CAl),
cert. denied,- U.S.- (1982).

"
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current income while preserving capital. Under a written
contract, petitioner Reich & Tang, Inc. ("R&T") provides the
Fund with investment advice and other management services
in exchange for a fee currently set at one-half of one percent
of the Fund's net assets. From 1978 to 1981, the Fund experienced substantial growth; its net assets increased from
about $75 million to $775 million. During this period, R&T's
fee of one-half of one percent of net assets remained the
same. Accordingly, annual payments by the Fund to R&T
rose from about $375,000 to an estimated $3,875,000 in 1981.
Alleging that these fees were unreasonable, respondent
brought this action in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, naming both the Fund
and R&T as defendants. The complaint alleged that, because the Fund's assets had been continually reinvested in a
limited number of instruments, R&T's investment decisions
had remained routine and substantially unchanged as the
Fund grew. By receiving significantly higher fees for essentially the same services, R&T had, according to respondent,
violated the fiduciary duty owed investment companies by
theiradvisersunder§36(b)oftheiCA. Pub. L. No. 91-547,
Section 20, 84 Stat. 1428, 15 U.S. C. §80a-35(b). 2 The
Section 36(b) of the ICA provides, in relevant part:
"For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with
respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company or by the security holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any affiliated person of
such investment adviser. An action may be brought under this subsection
by the Commission, or by a security holder of such registered investment
company on behalf of such company, against such investment adviser, or
any affiliated person of such investment adviser, or any ot.h er person enumerated in subsection (a) of this section who has a fiduciary duty concerning such compensation or payments, for breach of fiduciary duty in respect
of such compensation or payments paid by such registered investment company or by the security holders thereof to such investment adviser or person. " 15 U. S. C. § 80a-35(b).
2
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complaint sought damages in favor of the Fund as well as
payment of respondent's costs, expenses, and attorney's fees.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit for failure to comply
with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23.1, which governs "a derivative
action brought by one or more shareholders . . . to enforce a
right of a corporation ... , the corporation . . . having failed
to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it .... "
The Rule requires a shareholder bringing such a suit to set
forth "the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the
action he desires from the directors . . . , and the reasons for
his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort." 8
Respondent contended that the Rule 23.1 "demand requirement" does not apply to actions brought under § 36(b) of the
Section 36(b) goes on to provide, inter alia, that proof of a defendant's
misconduct is unnecessary, § 80a-35(b)(l), that approval by the board of directors or shareholders of the adviser's compensation "shall be given such
consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances,"§ 80a-35(b)(2), and that recovery is limited to actual damages for
a period of one year prior to suit, § 80a-35(b)(3).
3
Rule 23.1 provides in full:
"In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members
to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the
corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1)
that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive
one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would
otherwise not have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the
efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the
directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders
or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not
making the effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the
right of the corporation or association. The action shall not be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members
in such manner as the court directs."

..
82-1200-0PINION
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ICA and that, in any event, demand was excused because the
Fund's directors had participated in the alleged wrongdoing
and would be hostile to the suit. The district court, finding
Rule 23.1 applicable to § 36(b) actions and finding no excuse
based on the directors' possible self-interest or bias, dismissed the action. Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 94
(SDNY 1982).
The Court of Appeals reversed. Fox v. Reich & Tang,
Inc., 692 F. 2d 250 (CA2 1982). The court concluded that
Rule 23.1 by its terms applies only when the corporation
could itself "'assert,' in a court, the same action under the
same rule of law on which the shareholder plaintiff relies."
I d., at 254.
Relying on both the language and the legislative history of § 36(b), the court determined that an investment company may not itself sue under that section to recover excessive adviser fees. I d., at 254-261. Accordingly,
the court held that Rule 23.1 does not apply to actions by security holders brought under § 36(b ). I d., at 261.
II

Although any action in which a shareholder asserts the
rights of a corporation could be characterized as "derivative,"
see n. 11 infra, Rule 23.1 applies in terms only to a "derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members
to enforce a right of a corporation [when] the corporation
[has] failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted
by it" (emphasis added). This qualifying language suggests
that the type of derivative action governed by the Rule is one
in which a shareholder claims a right that could have been,
but was not, "asserted" by the corporation in court. The
"right" mentioned in the emphasized phrase, which cannot
sensibly mean any right without limitation, is most naturally
understood as referring to the same right, or at least its substantial equivalent, as the one asserted by the plaintiff shareholder. And, in the context of a rule of judicial procedure,
the reference to the corporation's "failure to enforce a right

82-1200-0PINION
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which may properly be asserted by it" o~ses )
that the right in question could be en!Orced by the corpora- l
tion in court.
This interpretation of the Rule is consistent with the understanding we have expressed, in a variety of contexts, of
the term "derivative action." In Hawes v. City of Oakland,
104 U. S. 450, 460 (1882), for instance, the Court explained
that a derivative suit is one "founded on a right of action existing in the corporation itself, and in which the corporation
itself is the appropriate plaintiff." Similarly, Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 548 (1949), stated that a derivative action allows a stockholder "to step into the corporation's shoes and to seek in its right the restitution he could
not demand in his own"; and the Court added that such a
stockholder "brings suit on a cause of action derived from the
corporation." Id., at 549. Finally, Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U. S. 531, 534 (1970), described a derivative action as "a suit
to enforce a corporate cause of action against officers, directors, and third parties" (emphasis in original) and viewed the
question there presented-whether the Seventh Amendment
confers a right to a jury in such an action-as the same as
whether the corporation, had it brought the suit itself, would
be entitled to a jury. ld., at 538-539. In sum, the term
"derivative action," which defines the scope of Rule 23.1, has
long been understood to apply only to those actions in which
the right claimed by the shareholder is one the corporation
could itself have enforced in court. See also Koster v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518, 522 (1947);
Price v. Gurney, 324 U. S. 100, 105 (1945); Delaware & Hudson R.R. Co. v. Albany & Susquehana R.R. Co., 213 U.S.
435, 447 (1909). 4
• One commentator has explained that "the derivative suit may be
viewed as the consolidation in equity of, on the one hand, a suit by the
shareholder against the directors in their official capacity, seeking an affinnative order that they sue the alleged wrongdoers, and, on the other, a
suit by the corporation against these wrongdoers." Note, Demand on Di-

LA~

Y
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The origin and purposes of Rule 23.1 support this under- )
standing of its scope. The Rule's provisions derive from this
Court's decision in Hawes v. City of Oakland, supra. Prior
to Hawes, federal courts exercising their equity powers had
commonly entertained suits by minority stockholders to enforce corporate rights in circumstances where the corporation had failed to sue on its own behalf. I d., at 452. See
Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, 339 (1855); 7A C. Wright &
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1821, at 296-297
(1972). The Court in Hawes, while emphasizing the importance of such suits as a means of "protecting the stockholder
against the frauds of the governing body of directors or trustees," 104 U. S., at 453, noted that this equitable device was
subject to two kinds of potential abuse. First, corporations
that were engaged in disputes with citizens of their home
state could collude with out-of-state stockholders to obtain diversity jurisdiction in order to litigate the dispute in the federal courts. I d., at 452-453. Second, derivative actions
brought by minority stockholders could, if unconstrained, undermine the basic principle of corporate governance that the
decisions of a corporation-including the decision to initiate
litigation-should be made by the board of directors or the
majority of shareholders. See id., at 454-457.
To address these problems, the Court in Hawes established
a number of prerequisites to bringing derivative suits in the
rectors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 Harv.
L. Rev. 746, 748 (1960). The Court in Hawes embraced this conception of
the suit as consolidating "two causes of action," 104 U. S., at 452, andreferred throughout its opinion to a derivative action as "one in which the
right of action [is] in the company," i d., at 455; see i d., at 457 (cases impose
limits on "the right of a stockholder to sue in cases where the corporation is
the proper party to bring the suit"). See also Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell
Gold Mini ng Co., 187 U. S. 455, 463 (1903) (describing rules governing de:.
rivative suits as limiting situations in which "a court of equity may be
called upon at the appeal of any single stockholder to compel the directors
of the corporation to enforce every right which it may possess, irrespective
of other considerations"); Black's Law Dictionary 1272 (5th ed., 1979).

'

.
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federal courts. These requirements were designed t~t
the
use of the device to situations in which, due to an unjusti----..
fied failure of the corporation to act for itself, it was appropriate o perrru a a
er o 1~and conduct a litigation which usually belongs to the corporation." Id., at 460.
With some additions and changes in wording, the conditions
set out in Hawes have been carried forward in successive revisions of the federal rules. 5
Some of the requirements first announced in Hawes were
intended to reduce the burden on the federal courts by diverting corporate causes of action "to the State courts, which
are their natural, their lawful, and their appropriate forum."
Id., at 452-453. 6 At the same time, however, the Court
~

'Shortly after Hawes was decided, the Court codified its requirements
in Equity Rule 94, which provided:
"Every bill brought by one or more shareholders in a corporation,
against the corporation and other parties, founded on rights which may
properly be asserted by the corporation, must be verified by oath, and
must contain an allegation that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time
of the transaction of which he complains, or that his share had devolved on
him since by operation of law; and that the suit is not a collusive one to
confer on a court of the United States jurisdiction of a case it would not
otherwise have cognizance. It must also set forth with particularity the
efforts of the plaintiff to secure such action as he desires on the part of the
managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, of the shareholders, and
the cause of his failure to obtain such action." 104 U. S. IX (1882).
In 1912, the Court replaced the original rule with Equity Rule 27, identical to its predecessor except that it added at the very end the phrase "or
the reasons for not making such effort." This language was apparently
intended to codify a judicially recognized exception to the old rule in certain
circumstances where, in the discretion of the court, a demand may be excused. See Delaware & Hudson R.R. v. Albany & Susquehanna R.R.,
213 u. s. 435 (1909).
When the federal rules were promulgated in 1937, the provisions of Equity Rule 27 were substantially restated in Rule 23(b). See 3B J. Moore &
J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice ~23.1.15[1], at p. 23.1-10 (2d ed.
1982). Finally, in 1966, the present version of new Rule 23.1 was adopted
as part of a comprehensive revision of the rules governing class actions.
See id., ~23 . 1.01, at p. 23.1-3.
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sought to maintain derivative suits as a limited exception to
the usual rule that the proper party to b~half
of acorporation is the corporation itself, acting through its
directors or the majority of its shareholders. ld., at
460-461. As the Court later explained, this aspect of the
rules governing derivative suits reflects the basic policy that
"[w ]hether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the
courts a cause of action for damages is, like other business
questions, ordinarily a matter of internal management and is
left to the discretion of the directors, in the absence of instruction by vote of the stockholders." United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U. S. 261, 263
(1917). See also Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining
Co., 187 U. S. 455, 463 (1903). 7
6

In particular, the Court required the complaint in a derivative suit to
allege that the plaintiff "was a shareholder at the time of the transactions
of which he complains, or that his shares have devolved on him since by
operation of law, and that the suit is not a collusive one to confer on a court
of the United States jurisdiction in a case of which it could otherwise have
no cognizance .... " 104 U. S., at 461. The second of these requirements
was clearly meant to discourage efforts t6 bring disputes between a company and citizens of the state of incorporation within the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. See supra, at --; 3 B J. Moore & J. Kennedy,
supra, ~ 23.1.15[1], at p. 23. i-14. Although the first requirement may
also have been intended to discourage contrived diversity suits, see id.,
~ 23.1.15[1], at p. 23.1-15, it is now understood as generally "aimed at preventing the federal courts from being used to litigate purchased grievances." 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1828, at pp. 341--342 (1972).
7
Like the requirements adopted in Hawes, the two major features of
Rule 23.1 added since that decision-the requirement that the plaintiff
"fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association" and the provision requiring notice and court approval of settlements-are also intended to prevent shareholders from suing in place of
· the corporation in circumstances where the action would disserve the legitimate interests of the company or its shareholders. See generally 7A
C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, §§ 1833 & 1839; 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy,
supra, ~~ 23.1.16[3] & 23.1.24.
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The principal means by which the Court in Hawes sought
to vindicate this policy was, of course, its requirement that a
shareholder seek action by the corporation itself before
bringing a derivative suit. 104 U. S., at 460-461. 8 This
"demand requirement" affords the directors an opportunity
to exercise their reasonable business judgment and "waive a
legal right vested in the corporation in the belief that its best
interests will be promoted by not insisting on such right.
They may regard the expense of enforcing the right or the
furtherance of the general business of the corporation in
determining whether to waive or insist upon the right."
Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U. S. 455,
463 (1903). On the other hand, if, in the view of the directors, "litigation is appropriate, acceptance of the demand
places the resources of the corporation, including its information, personnel, funds, and counsel, behind the suit." Note,
The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 168, 171-172 (1976)
(footnote omitted). Like the Rule in general, therefore, the
provisions regarding de~awsuit that coUld be
Although the Court in Hawes imposed a direct requirement that shareholders make demand on directors before bringing suit, 104 U. S., at
460-461, Rule 23.1 as presently written requires only that a shareholder's
"complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by
the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority .... "(emphasis added). Relying on the emphasized qualification, added to the Rule without comment by the drafters in 1966, see n.
4, supra, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), appearing as
amicus curiae, contends that the Rule does not itself oblige the shareholder to make a demand; instead, it simply requires the plaintiff to plead
compliance with applicable obligations of substantive law, ordinarily that of
the state of incorporation. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 478 (1979).
Because we conclude that a suit brought under § 36(b) of the Investment
Company Act is not a "derivative action" for purposes of Rule 23.1, see
infra, at - - , we need not decide whether the Rule itself, as a matter of
federal procedure, makes demand on directors the predicate to a proper
derivative suit in federal courts or whether any such obligation must instead be found in applicable substantive law.
8

'
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controlled by the cor oration's board of directors. 9 ~
~~- s~, the conceptual basis and purposes of Rule 23.1 confirm what its language suggests: the Rule governs only suits
"to enforce a right of a corporation" when the corporation itself has "failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it" in court. In this case, therefore, we must decide whether the right asserted by a hareho
suing under
§ 36(6)0[fhe nvestment Company Act co~ enforced by the investment company. 10 We turn to consider
that q
Petitioners point out that, even in cases where the corporation could
not control the shareholder's lawsuit, a demand on directors affords management an opportunity to pursue non-judicial remedies for the shareholder's grievance. But however desirable the encouragement of intracorporate remedies may be as a matter of policy, it is not, standing alone,
enough to make a suit that the corporation can neither initiate nor terminate a "derivative action" within the meaning of Rule 23.1. Such a suit
does not come within the Rule's language as it is most naturally interpreted
and as we have consistently understood it. See supra, at - - . Moreover, the Rule and its predecessors were directed at ensuring that the
proper party was before the court in a certain class of cases, see supra, at
- - , and a shareholder action that the corporation cannot control raises no
proper party concerns.
'"Petitioners contend that, even if an investment company could not
bring a suit under § 36(b), a shareholder's action under that section is nevertheless derivative for purposes of Rule 23.1 because the investment company has a similar right to" recover excessive fees from its investment adviser under a state law cause of action for corporate waste. See, e. g.,
Llewellyn v. Queen City Dairy, Inc., 48 A. 2d 322, 326 (Md. 1946). The
fact that the corporation may be able to achieve some of the results contemplated by§ 36(b) under state law does not, however, demonstrate that
a shareholder's action brought under an independent federal statute claims
"a right which may properly be asserted" by the corporation. See supra,
at - - . The new right created by § 36(b) is not only formally distinct
from that asserted in a state claim of corporate waste; it is substantively
different as well. Indeed, an important reason for the enactment of§ 36(b)
was Congress's belief that the standards applied in corporate waste actions
were inadequate to ensure reasonable adviser fees. As the Senate Committee that reported the bill that became § 36(b) explained:
9

..
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III
In determining whether § 36(b) confers a right that could
be judicially enforced by an investment company, we look
first, of course, at the language of the statute. As noted
above, supra at - - and n. 1, § 36(b) imposes a fiduciary
duty on an investment company's aaviser "with respect to
the receipt of compensation for services" paid by the company and provides that "[a]n action may be brought under
this subsection by the [Secun 1es an
xc an e o mission,~ y a secur1 y o er of sue registered investment
company 0~ company" against the adviser and
other affiliated parties. By its terms, then, the unusual
cause of action created by § 36(b) differs significantly from
those traditionally asserted in shareholder derivative suits.
Instead of establishin a corporate action from which a sharehoi er ng to sue erivatlve y may e inferred, § 36(b) expressly provides that the new cor orate right it crea't'e'S'ffiay
be
by the
ecuri 1es and
xchange
C) and security ho ders of the company. 11

-----

Under general rules of law, advisory contracts which are ratified by the
shareholders, or in some States approved by a vote of the disinterested directors, may not be upset in the courts except upon a showing of "corporate waste." As one court put it, the fee must "Shock the conscience of
the court." Such a rule may not be an improper one when the protections
of arm's-length bargaining are present. But in the mutual fund industry
where[] these marketplace forces are not likely to operate as effectively,
your committee has decided that the standard of "corporate waste" is unduly restrictive and recommends that it be changed." S. Rep. No. 91-184,
p. 5 (1970)
See infra, at - - and n. 12.
11
Petitioners argue that, because § 36(b) provides for an action "by a security holder of such registered investment company on behalf of such
company" (emphasis added), such an action is necessarily derivative. In
this regard, petitioners rely on this Court's statement in Burks v. Lasker,
441 U. S. 471, 477 (1979) that a "derivative suit is brought by shareholders
to enforce a claim on behalf of the corporation" (emphasis added). See also
id., at 484 (referring to actions brought under § 36(b) as "derivative").
The "on behalf" language indicates, however, only that the right asserted
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Petitioners ne
hele s contend that an investment company has a implied ri ht of action nder § 36(b). In evaluating such a claim, our focus must be on the ~ss
when it enacted the statute in question. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 377-378
(1982). That intent may in turn be discerned by examining a
number oflactors, including the ~ and purposes of the statute, the identity of tlie class for whoseparticular benefit the statute was passed, and the traditional
role of the states in affording the relief claimed. Ibid.; California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 292-293 (1981); Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash,
422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975). In this case, consideration of each of
these factors plainly demonstrates that Congress intended
the unique right created by § 36(b) to be enforced solely by
the SEC and security holders of the investment company.
As we have previously noted, Congress adopted the Investment Company Act of 1940 because of its concern with
"the potential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment companies." Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 480
(1979). Unlike most corporations, an investment company is
typically created and managed by a pre-existing external
organization known as an investment adviser. I d., at 481.

----------

by a shareholder suing under§ 36(b) is a "right of the corporation"-a proposition confirmed by other aspects of the action: The fiduciary duty imposed on advisers by § 36(b) is owed to the company itself as well as its
shareholders and any recovery obtained in a § 36(b) action will go to the
company rather than the plaintiff. See S. Rep. No. 91-184, p. 6 (1970);
§ 36(b)(3). In this respect, a § 36(b) action is undeniably "derivative" in
. As we have noted,
the broad sense of that word. See supra, at however, Rule 23.1 applies by its terms only to "a derivative action
brought by one or more shareholders . . . to enforce a right of a corporation
[when] the corporation [has] failed to enforce a right which may properly
be asserted by it" (emphasis added). Ibid. The legislative history of
§ 36(b) makes clear that Congress intended the perhaps unique "right of a
corporation" established by § 36(b) to be asserted by the company's security holders and not by the company itself. Infra, at .

..
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Because the adviser generally supervises the daily operation
of the fund and often selects affiliated persons to serve on the
company's board of directors, the "relationship between investment advisers and mutual funds is fraught with potential
conflicts of interest." Ibid., quoting Galfand v. Chestnutt
Corp., 545 F. 2d 807, 808 (CA2 1976). In order to minimize
such conflicts of interests, Congress established a scheme
that regulates most transactions between investment companies and their advisers, 15 U. S. C. §80a-17; limits the number of persons affiliated with the adviser who may serve on
the fund's board of directors, § 80a-10; and requires that fees
for investment advice and other services be governed by a
written contract approved both by the directors and the
shareholders of the fund, § 80a-15.
In the years following passage of the Act, investment companies enjoyed enormous growth, prompting a number of
studies of the effectiveness of the Act in protecting investors.
One such report, commissioned by the SEC, found that investment advisers often charged mutual funds higher fees
than those charged the advisers' other clients and further determined that the structure of the industry, even as regulated by the Act, had proven resistant to efforts to moderate
adviser compensation. Wharton School Study of Mutual
Funds, H. R. Rep. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pp.
28-30, 34, 6&-67 (1962). Specifically, the study concluded
that the unaffiliated directors mandated by the Act were "of
restricted value as an instrument for providing effective
representation of mutual fund shareholders in dealings between the fund and its investment adviser." Id., at 34. A
subsequent report, authored by the SEC itself, noted that investment advisers were generally compensated on the basis
of a fixed percentage of the fund's assets, rather than on
services rendered or actual expenses. Securities & Exchange Commission, Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, H. R. Rep. No. 89-2337, p. 89 (1966)
(hereinafter SEC Report). The Commission determined

'

.

82-1200---0PINION
14

DAILY INCOME FUND, INC. v. FOX

that, as a fund's assets grew, this form of payment could
produce unreasonable fees in light of the economies of scale
realized in managing a larger portfolio. Id., at 94, 102.
Furthermore, the Commission concluded that lawsuits by security holders challenging the reasonableness of adviser fees
had been largely ineffective due to the standards employed
by courts to judge the fees. Id., at 132-143. See infra, at
--and n. 12.
In order to remedy this and other perceived inadequacies
in the Act, the SEC submitted a series of legislative proposals to Congress that led to the 1970 Amendments to the Act.
Some of the proposals Congress ultimately adopted were intended to make the fund's board of directors more independent of the adviser and to encourage greater scrutiny of adviser contracts.
See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §80a-10(a)
(requiring that at least 40% of the directors not be "interested persons," a broader category than the previously identified group of persons "affiliated" with the adviser, see
§ 80a-2(a)(19)); § 80a-15(c) (requiring ·independent directors
as well as shareholders to approve adviser contracts); Burks
v. Lasker, supra, 441 U. S., at 482-483. The SEC had,
however, determined that approval of adviser contracts by
shareholders and independent directors could not alone provide complete protection of the interests of security holders
with respect to adviser compensation. See SEC Report,
supra, at p. 128-131, 144, 146-147. Accordingly, the Commission also proposed amending the Act to require "reasonable" fees. I d., at 143-147. As initially considered by Congress, the bill containing this proposal would have
empowered the SEC to bring actions to enforce the reasonableness standard and to intervene in any similar action
brought by or on behalf of the company. H. R. 9510, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1967); S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 8(d) (1967).
Representatives of the investment company industry, led
by amicus Investment Company Institute (ICI), expressed

'
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concern that enabling the SEC to enforce the fairness of adviser fees might in essence provide the Commission with
rate-making authority. Accordingly, ICI proposed an alternative to the SEC bill which would have provided that actions to enforce the reasonableness standard "be brought
only by the company or a security holder thereof on its behalf." Mutual Fund Legislation of 1967: Hearings on S. 1659
Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, at pp. 100-101 (1967) (hereinafter )
1967 Hearings). The version that the Senate finally passed,
however, rejected the industry's suggestion that the investment compa 1 e e ex ress y au o 1ze to brmg suit.
s~ 3724,
ong.,
ess.
nsteatl, the
Senate bill required a security holder to make demand on the
SEC before bringing suit and provided that, if the Commission refused or failed to bring an action within six months,
the security holder could maintain a suit against the adviser
in a "derivative" or representative capacity. !bid. Like the
original SEC proposal, however, the Senate bill provided
that the SEC could intervene in any action brought by the
company or by a security holder on its behalf. I d., § 22.
After the bill was reintroduced in the 91st Congress, further hearings and consultations with the industry led to the
present version of§ 36(b). See S. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 20(b) (1969); 115 Cong. Rec. 13648 (1969) (Statement of Sen.
Mcintyre). The new version adopted "a different method of
testing management compensation." S. Rep. No. 91-184, at
p. 5 (1969). Instead of containing a statutory standard of
"reasonableness," the new version imposed a "fiduciary duty''
on investment advisers. I d., at pp. 5-6. The new bill further provided that "either the SEC or a shareholder may sue
in court on a complaint that a mutual fund's management fees
involve a breach of fiduciary duty." I d., at 7. The reference in the previous bill to the derivative or representative
nature of the security holder action was eliminated, as was
the earlier provision for intervention by the SEC in actions

82-12~PINION

DAILY INCOME FUND, INC. v. FOX

16

brought by the investment company itself. See S. 2224,
supra, §22.
In short, Congress rejected a ro osal that would have expressly made t e statutory stan ard overnin adviser fees
enforcea e y e mvestmen company Itself and a opted in
its place a provision containing none of the indications in earlier drafts that the company could bring such a suit. This
legislative history strongly suggests that, in adopting§ 36(b),
Congress did not intend to create an implied right of action in
favor of the investment company.
That conclusion is further supported by the purposes of the
statute. As noted above, the SEC proposed the predecessor
to § 36(b) because of its concern that the structural requirements for investment companies imposed by the Act would
not alone ensure reasonable adviser fees. See supra, at
- - . Indeed, the Commission concluded that the Act's provisions for independent directors and approval of adviser contracts had actually frustrated effective challenges to adviser
fees. In particular,· the Commission noted tfiat in the three
fully litigated cases in which security holders had attacked
such fees under state law, the courts had relied on the approval of adviser contracts by security holders or unaffiliated
directors to uphold the fees. SEC Report, supra, at p.
132-143. 12 For this reason, the Senate Report proposing the
final version of the statute noted that, while shareholder and
directorial approval of the adviser's contract are entitled to
In the three cases cited by the SEC, the courts had evaluated the adviser contracts according to common law standards of corporate waste,
under which an unreasonable or unfair fee might be approved unless the
court deemed it "unconscionable" or "shocking." SEC Report, supra, at
142. See Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F . Supp. 527, 548-549 (D. Colo.
1963); Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 486, 184 A. 2d 602, 610 (1962);
Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A. 2d 720, 723 (1961). Similarly, security holders challenging adviser fees under the Investment Company Act itself had been required to prove gross abuse of trust. See
Brown v. Bullock , 194 F . Supp. 207 (SDNY 1961), aff'd, 294 F. 2d 415
(CA2 1961). See 1967 Hearings, supra, at 117-118.
12

\
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serious consideration by the court in a § 36(b) action, "such
consideration would not be controlling in determining
whether or not the fee encompassed a breach of fiduciary
duty." S. Rep. No. 91-184, at p. 15 (1969); see id., at p. 5.
In contrast to its approach in other aspects of the 1970
amendments, then, Congress decided not to rely solely on the
fund's directors to assure reasonable adviser fees, notwithstanding the increased disinterestedness of the board. See
Burks v. Lasker, supra, 441 U. S., at 481-482 n. 10 and 484.
See also SEC Report, supra, at 146-148 (right of SEC and
security holders to bring actions essential; although role of
disinterested directors should be enhanced, "even a requirement that all of the directors of an externally managed investment company be persons unaffiliated with the company's adviser-underwriter would not be an effective check on
advisory fees and other forms of management compensation"). This policy choice strongly indicates that Congress
intended security holder and SEC actions under § 36(b), on
the one hand, and directorial approval of adviser contracts,
on the other, to act as independent checks on excessive fees.
Nor do other factors on which we have relied to identify an
implie cause of action sup~ petitioners ~~im that the
right asserted by a shareholder in a§ 36(b) action could be enforced by the investment company. First, investment companies, as well as the investing public, are undoubtedly
within "the class for whose especial benefit" § 36(b) was enacted, Cart v. Ash, supra, 422 U. S., at 78 (emphasis in original), seen. 11, supra. Section§ 36(b)'s express provision for
actions by security holders, owever, ensures t at, even if
tfie com
1rectors cannot bring an action in the fund's
name, the com any's rights under the statut~~ly
vindicated by plainti s au or1ze to act on its behalf. For
this reason, 1 IS unnecessary to infer a right o action in favor
of the corporation in order to serve the statute's "broad remedial purpose." Cf., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
- - U. S. - - , - - (1983). See also Middlesex County

l

'

.

82-1200-0PINION
18

DAILY INCOME FUND, INC. v. FOX

Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453
U. S. 1, 13, 15 (1981). Second, because § 36(b) creates an entirely new right, it was obviously not enacted "in a statutory
context in which an implied private remedy [had] already
been recognized by the courts." Cf., Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith v. Curran, supra, 456 U. S., at 378; Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, supra, at--. Third, a
corporation's rights against its directors or third parties with
whom it has contracted are generally governed by state, not
federal, law. Burks v. Lasker, supra, 441 U. S., at 478.
See Cort v. Ash, supra, 422 U. S., at 78.
IV
A shareholder derivative action is an exception to the normal rule that the proper party to bring a suit on behalf of a
corporation is the corporation itself, acting through its directors or a majority of its shareholders. Accordingly, Rule
23.1, which establishes procedures designed to prevent minority shareholders from abusing this equitable device, is addressed only to situations in which shareholders seek to enforce a right that "may properly be asserted" by the
corporation itself. In contrast, as the language of § 36(b) indicates, Congress intended the fiduciary duty imposed on investment advisers by that statute to be enforced solely by security holders of the investment company and the SEC. It
would be anomalous, therefore, to apply a Rule intended to
prevent a shareholder from improperly suing in place of the
corporation to a statute, like § 36(b), conferring a right which
the corporation itself cannot enforce. It follows that Rule
23.1 does not apply to an action brought by a shareholder
under § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act and that the
plaintiff in such a case need not first make a demand upon the
fund's directors before bringing suit.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

Affirmed.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-1200

DAILY INCOME FUND, INC. AND REICH & TANG,
INC., PETITIONERS v. MARTIN FOX
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[January-, 1984]

delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision is whether Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an investment
company security holder first make a demand upon the company's board of directors before bringing an action under
§ 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA or Act)
to recover allegedly excessive fees paid by the company to its
investment adviser. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held in this case that the demand requirement of Rule
23.1 does not apply to such actions. Fox v. Reich & Tang,
Inc., 692 F. 2d 250 (CA2 1982). Two other Courts of Appeals have reached a contrary conclusion. 1 We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict,-- U. S. - - (1983), and now
affirm.
JusTICE BRENNAN

I

Respondent is a shareholder of petitioner Daily Income
Fund, Inc. ("Fund"), an open-end diversified management investment company, or "mutual fund," regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("ICA" or "Act"), 15 U. S. C.
§80a-1 et seq. The Fund invests in a portfolio of short-term
money market instruments with the aim of achieving high
1
Weiss v. Temporary Investment Fund, Inc. , 692 F. 2d 928 (CA3 1982),
cert. pending, No. 82-1592; Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F. 2d 115 (CAl),
cert. denied,- U.S.- (1982).
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current income while preserving capital. Under a written
contract, petitioner Reich & Tang, Inc. ("R&T") provides the
Fund with investment advice and other management services
in exchange for a fee currently set at one-half of one percent
of the Fund's net assets. From 1978 to 1981, the Fund experienced substantial growth; its net assets increased from
about $75 million to $775 million. During this period, R&T's
fee of one-half of one percent of net assets remained the
same. Accordingly, annual payments by the Fund to R&T
rose from about $375,000 to an estimated $3,875,000 in 1981.
Alleging that these fees were unreasonable, respondent
brought this action in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, naming both the Fund
and R&T as defendants. The complaint alleged that, because the Fund's assets had been continually reinvested in a
limited number of instruments, R&T's investment decisions
had remained routine and substantially unchanged as the
Fund grew. By receiving significantly higher fees for essentially the same services, R&T had, according to respondent,
violated the fiduciary duty owed investment companies by
their advisers under§ 36(b) of the ICA. Pub. L. No. 91-547,
Section 20, 84 Stat. 1428, 15 U. S. C. §80a--35(b). 2 The
2

Section 36(b) of the ICA provides, in relevant part:
"For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with
respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company or by the security holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any affiliated person of
such investment adviser. An action may be brought under this subsection
by the Commission, or by a security holder of such registered investment
company on behalf of such company, against such investment adviser, or
any affiliated person of such investment adviser, or any other person enumerated in subsection (a) of this section who has a fiduciary duty concerning such compensation or payments, for breach of fiduciary duty in respect
of such compensation or payments paid by such registered investment company or by the security holders thereof to such investment adviser or person." 15 U. S. C. § 80a-35(b).
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complaint sought damages in favor of the Fund as well as
payment of respondent's costs, expenses, and attorney's fees.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit for failure to comply
with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23.1, which governs "a derivative
action brought by one or more shareholders . . . to enforce a
right of a corporation ... , the corporation ... having failed
to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it. . . ."
The Rule requires a shareholder bringing such a suit to set
forth "the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the
action he desires from the directors . . . , and the reasons for
his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort." 8
Respondent contended that the Rule 23.1 "demand requirement" does not apply to actions brought under § 36(b) of the
Section 36(b) goes on to provide, inter alia, that proof of a defendant's
misconduct is unnecessary, § 80a-35(b)(1), that approval by the board of directors or shareholders of the adviser's compensation "shall be given such
consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances,"§ 80a-35(b)(2), and that recovery is limited to actual damages for
a period of one year prior to suit, § 80a-35(b)(3).
3
Rule 23.1 provides in full:
"In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members
to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the
corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1)
that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive
one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would
otherwise not have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the
efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the
directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders
or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not
making the effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the
right of the corporation or association. The action shall not be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members
in such manner as the court directs."

----
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ICA and that, in any event, demand was excused because the
Fund's directors had participated in the alleged wrongdoing
and would be hostile to the suit. The district court, finding
Rule 23.1 applicable to § 36(b) actions and finding no excuse
based on the directors' possible self-interest or bias, dismissed the action. Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 94 F. R. D.
94 (SDNY 1982).
The Court of Appeals reversed. Fox v. Reich & Tang,
Inc., 692 F. 2d 250 (CA2 1982). The court concluded that
Rule 23.1 by its terms applies only when the corporation
could itself "'assert,' in a court, the same action under the
same rule of law on which the shareholder plaintiff relies."
I d., at 254. Relying on both the language and the legislative
history of § 36(b), the court determined that an investment
company may not itself sue under that section to recover excessive adviser fees. !d., at 254-261. Accordingly, the
court held that Rule 23.1 does not apply to actions by security
holders brought under § 36(b). I d., at 261.
II

Although any action in which a shareholder asserts the
rights of a corporation could be characterized as "derivative,"
seen. 11 infra, Rule 23.1 applies in terms only to a "derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members
to enforce a right of a corporation [when] the corporation
[has]failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted
by it" (emphasis added). This qualifying language suggests
that the type of derivative action governed by the Rule is one
in which a shareholder claims a right that could have been,
but was not, "asserted" by the corporation in court. The
"right" mentioned in the emphasized phrase, which cannot
sensibly mean any right without limitation, is most naturally
understood as referring to the same right, or at least its substantial equivalent, as the one asserted by the plaintiff shareholder. And, in the context of a rule of judicial procedure,
the reference to the corporation's "failure to enforce a right
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which may properly be asserted by it" obviously presupposes
that the right in question could be enforced by the corporation in court.
This interpretation of the Rule is consistent with the understanding we have expressed, in a variety of contexts, of
the term "derivative action." In Hawes v. City of Oakland,
104 U. S. 450, 460 (1882), for instance, the Court explained
that a derivative suit is one "founded on a right of action existing in the corporation itself, and in which the corporation
itself is the appropriate plaintiff." Similarly, Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 548 (1949), stated that a derivative action allows a stockholder "to step into the corporation's shoes and to seek in its right the restitution he could
not demand in his own"; and the Court added that such a
stockholder "brings suit on a cause of action derived from the
corporation." Id., at 549. Finally, Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U. S. 531, 534 (1970), described a derivative action as "a suit
to enforce a corporate cause of action against officers, directors, and third parties" (emphasis in original) and viewed the
question there presented-whether the Seventh Amendment
confers a right to a jury in such an action-as the same as
whether the corporation, had it brought the suit itself, would
be entitled to a jury. Id., at 538-539. In sum, the term
"derivative action," which defines the scope of Rule 23.1, has
long been understood to apply only to those actions in which
the right claimed by the shareholder is one the corporation
could itself have enforced in court. See also Koster v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518, 522 (1947);
Price v. Gurney, 324 U. S. 100, 105 (1945); Delaware & Hudson R. Co. v. Albany & Susquehana R. Co., 213 U. S. 435,
447 (1909). 4
'One commentator has explained that "the derivative suit may be
viewed as the consolidation in equity of, on the one hand, a suit by the
shareholder against the directors in their official capacity, seeking an affirmative order that they sue the alleged wrongdoers, and, on the other, a
suit by the corporation against these wrongdoers." Note, Demand on Di-
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The origin and purposes of Rule 23.1 support this understanding of its scope. The Rule's provisions derive from this
Court's decision in Hawes v. City of Oakland, supra. Prior
to Hawes, federal courts exercising their equity powers had
commonly entertained suits by minority stockholders to enforce corporate rights in circumstances where the corporation had failed to sue on its own behalf. I d., at 452. See
Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, 339 (1855); 7A C. Wright &
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1821, at 296-297
(1972). The Court in Hawes, while emphasizing the importance of such suits as a means of "protecting the stockholder
against the frauds of the governing body of directors.or trustees," 104 U. S., at 453, noted that this equitable device was
subject to two kinds of potential abuse. First, corporations
that were engaged in disputes with citizens of their home
state could collude with out-of-state stockholders to obtain diversity jurisdiction in order to litigate the dispute in the federal courts. I d., at 452-453. Second, derivative actions
brought by minority stockholders could, if unconstrained, undermine the basic principle of corporate governance that the
decisions of a corporation-including the decision to initiate
litigation-should be made by the board of directors or the
majority of shareholders. See id., at 454--457.
To address these problems, the Court in Hawes established
a number of prerequisites to bringing derivative suits in the
rectors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 Harv.
L. Rev. 746, 748 (1960). The Court in Hawes embraced this conception of
the suit as consolidating "two causes of action," 104 U. S., at 452, andreferred throughout its opinion to a derivative action as "one in which the
right of action [is] in the company," i d., at 455; see i d., at 457 (cases impose
limits on "the right of a stockholder to sue in cases where the corporation is
the proper party to bring the suit"). See also Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell
Gold Mining Co., 187 U. S. 455, 463 (1903) (describing rules governing derivative suits as limiting situations in which "a court of equity may be
called upon at the appeal of any single stockholder to compel the directors
of the corporation to enforce every right which it may possess, irrespective
of other considerations"); Black's Law Dictionary 1272 (5th ed. , 1979).
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federal courts. These requirements were designed to limit
the use of the device to situations in which, due to an unjustified failure of the corporation to act for itself, it was appropriate to permit a shareholder "to institute and conduct a litigation which usually belongs to the corporation." I d., at 460.
With some additions and changes in wording, the conditions
set out in Hawes have been carried forward in successive revisions of the federal rules. 5
Some of the requirements first announced in Hawes were
intended to reduce the burden on the federal courts by diverting corporate causes of action "to the State courts, which
are their natural, their lawful, and their appropriate forum."
Id., at 452-453. 6 At the same time, however, the Court
5
Shortly after Hawes was decided, the Court codified its requirements
in Equity Rule 94, which provided:
"Every bill brought by one or more shareholders in a corporation,
against the corporation and other parties, founded on rights which may
properly be asserted by the corporation, must be verified by oath, and
must contain an allegation that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time
of the transaction of which he complains, or that his share had devolved on
him since by operation of law; and that 'the suit is not a collusive one to
confer on a court of the United States jurisdiction of a case it would not
otherwise have cognizance. It must also set forth with particularity the
efforts of the plaintiff to secure such action as he desires on the part of the
managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, of the shareholders, and
the cause of his failure to obtain such action." 104 U. S. IX (1882).
In 1912, the Court replaced the original rule with Equity Rule 27, identical to its predecessor except that it added at the very end the phrase "or
the reasons for not making such effort." This language was apparently
intended to codify a judicially recognized exception to the old rule in certain
circumstances where, in the discretion of the court, a demand may be excused. See Delaware & Hudson R. Co. v. Albany & Susquehanna R.
Co., 213 U. S. 435 (1909).
When the federal rules were promulgated in 1937, the provisions of Equity Rule 27 were substantially restated in Rule 23(b). See 3B J. Moore &
J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice ~23.1.15[1], at p. 23.1-10 (2d ed.
1982). Finally, in 1966, the present version of new Rule 23.1 was adopted
as part of a comprehensive revision of the rules governing class actions.
See id. , ~23 . 1.01 , at p. 23.1-3.
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sought to maintain derivative suits as a limited exception to
the usual rule that the proper party to bring a claim on behalf
of a corporation is the corporation itself, acting through its
directors or the majority of its shareholders. I d., at
460-461. As the Court later explained, this aspect of the
rules governing derivative suits reflects the basic policy that
"[w]hether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the
courts a cause of action for damages is, like other business
questions, ordinarily a matter of internal management and is
left to the discretion of the directors, in the absence of instruction by vote of the stockholders." United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U. S. 261, 263
(1917). See also Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining
Co., 187 U. S. 455, 463 (1903). 7
In particular, the Court required the complaint in a derivative suit to
allege that the plaintiff "was a shareholder at the time of the transactions
of which he complains, or that his shares have devolved on him since by
operation of law, and that the suit is not a collusive one to confer on a court
of the United States jurisdiction in a case of which it could otherwise have
no cognizance.... " 104 U. S., at 461. The second of these requirements
was clearly meant to discourage efforts to bring disputes between a company and citizens of the state of incorporation within the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. See supra, at 6; 3 B J. Moore & J. Kennedy,
supra, U3.1.15[1], at p. 23.1-14. Although the first requirement may
also have been intended to discourage contrived diversity suits, see id.,
~ 23.1.15[1], at p. 23.1-15, it is now understood as generally "aimed at preventing the federal courts from being used to litigate purchased grievances." 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1828, at pp. 341-342 (1972).
7
Like the requirements adopted in Hawes, the two major features of
Rule 23.1 added since that decision-the requirement that the plaintiff
"fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association" and the provision requiring notice and court approval of settlements-are also intended to prevent shareholders from suing in place of
the corporation in circumstances where the action would disserve the legitimate interests of the company or its shareholders. See generally 7A
C. Wright & A. Miller, supra,§§ 1833 & 1839; 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy,
supra, ~~ 23.1.16[3] & 23.1.24.
6
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The principal means by which the Court in Hawes sought
to vindicate this policy was, of course, its requirement that a
shareholder seek action by the corporation itself before
bringing a derivative suit. 104 U. S., at 460-461. 8 This
"demand requirement" affords the directors an opportunity
to exercise their reasonable business judgment and "waive a
legal right vested in the corporation in the belief that its best
interests will be promoted by not insisting on such right.
They may regard the expense of enforcing the right or the
furtherance of the general business of the corporation in
determining whether to waive or insist upon the right."
Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U. S. 455,
463 (1903). On the other hand, if, in the view of the directors, "litigation is appropriate, acceptance of the demand
places the resources of the corporation, including its information, personnel, funds, and counsel, behind the suit." Note,
The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 168, 171-172 (1976)
(footnote omitted). Like the Rule in general, therefore, the
provisions regarding demand assume a lawsuit that could be
8

Although the Court in Hawes imposed a direct requirement that shareholders make demand on directors before bringing suit, 104 U. S., at
460-461, Rule 23.1 as presently written requires only that a shareholder's
"complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by
the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority .... "(emphasis added). Relying on the emphasized qualification, added to the Rule without comment by the drafters in 1966, see n.
4, supra, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), appearing as
amicus curiae, contends that the Rule does not itself oblige the shareholder to make a demand; instead, it simply requires the plaintiff to plead
compliance with applicable obligations of substantive law, ordinarily that of
the state of incorporation. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 478 (1979).
Because we conclude that a suit brought under § 36(b) of the Investment
Company Act is not a "derivative action" for purposes of Rule 23.1, see
irifra, at 18, we need not decide whether the Rule itself, as a matter of
federal procedure, makes demand on directors the predicate to a proper
derivative suit in federal courts or whether any such obligation must instead be found in applicable substantive law.
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controlled by the corporation's board of directors. 9
In sum, the conceptual basis and purposes of Rule 23.1 confirm what its language suggests: the Rule governs only suits
"to enforce a right of a corporation" when the corporation itself has "failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it" in court. In this case, therefore, we must decide whether the right asserted by a shareholder suing under
§ 36(b) of the Investment Company Act could be judicially enforced by the investment company. 10 We turn to consider
that question.
9
Petitioners point out that, even in cases where the corporation could
not control the shareholder's lawsuit, a demand on directors affords management an opportunity to pursue non-judicial remedies for the shareholder's grievance. But however desirable the encouragement of intracorporate remedies may be as a matter of policy, it is not, standing alone,
enough to make a suit that the corporation can neither initiate nor terminate a "derivative action" within the meaning of Rule 23.1. Such a suit
does not come within the Rule's language as it is most naturally interpreted
and as we have consistently understood it. See supra, at 4-5. Moreover,
the Rule and its predecessors were directed at ensuring that the proper
party was before the court in a certain class of cases, see supra, at ~10,
and a shareholder action that the corporation cannot control raises no
proper party concerns.
10
Petitioners contend that, even if an investment company could not
bring a suit under § 36(b), a shareholder's action under that section is nevertheless derivative for purposes of Rule 23.1 because the investment company has a similar right to recover excessive fees from its investment adviser under a state law cause of action for corporate waste. See, e. g.,
Llewellyn v. Queen City Dairy, Inc., 48 A. 2d 322, 326 (Md. 1946). The
fact that the corporation may be able to achieve some of the results contemplated by§ 36(b) under state law does not, however, demonstrate that
a shareholder's action brought under an independent federal statute claims
"a right which may properly be asserted" by the corporation. See supra,
at 4-5. The new right created by § 36(b) is not only formally distinct from
that asserted in a state claim of corporate waste; it is substantively different as well. Indeed, an important reason for the enactment of§ 36(b) was
Congress's belief that the standards applied in corporate waste actions
were inadequate to ensure reasonable adviser fees. As the Senate Com. mittee that reported the bill that became § 36(b) explained:

'

.
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III
In determining whether § 36(b) confers a right that could
be judicially enforced by an investment company, we look
first, of course, at the language of the statute. As noted
above, supra at 2 and n. 2, § 36(b) imposes a fiduciary duty on
an investment company's adviser "with respect to the receipt
of compensation for services" paid by the company and provides that "[a]n action may be brought under this subsection
by the [Securities and Exchange] Commission, or by a security holder of such registered investment company on behalf
of such company'' against the adviser and other affiliated parties. By its terms, then, the unusual cause of action created
by § 36(b) differs significantly from those traditionally asserted in shareholder derivative suits. Instead of establishing a corporate action from which a shareholder's right to sue
derivatively may be inferred, § 36(b) expressly provides only
that the new corporate right it creates may be enforced by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and security
holders of the company. 11
"Under general rules of law, advisory contracts which are ratified by the
shareholders, or in some States approved by a vote of the disinterested directors, may not be upset in the courts except upon a showing of 'corporate
waste.' As one court put it, the fee must 'Shock the conscience of the
court.' Such a rule may not be an improper one when the protections of
arm's-length bargaining are present. But in the mutual fund industry
where[] these marketplace forces are not likely to operate as effectively,
your committee has decided that the standard of 'corporate waste' is unduly restrictive and recommends that it be changed." S. Rep. No. 91-184,
p. 5 (1970).
See irifra, at 16 and n. 12.
11
Petitioners argue that, because § 36(b) provides for an action "by a security holder of such registered investment company on behalf of such
company" (emphasis added), such an action is necessarily derivative. In
this regard, petitioners rely on this Court's statement in Burks v. Lasker,
441 U. S. 471, 477 (1979) that a "derivative suit is brought by shareholders
to enforce a claim on behalf of the corporation" (emphasis added). See also
id., at 484 (referring to actions brought under § 36(b) as "derivative").
The fact that derivative suits are brought on behalf of a corporation does 1
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Petitioners nevertheless contend that an investment company has an implied right of action under § 36(b). In evaluating such a claim, our focus must be on the intent of Congress
when it enacted the statute in question. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 377-378
(1982). That intent may in turn be discerned by examining a
number of factors, including the legislative history and purposes of the statute, the identity of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was passed, the existence of express statutory remedies adequate to serve the legislative
purpose, and the traditional role of the states in affording the
relief claimed. Ibid.; Middlesex County Sewerage Authority
v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U. S. 1, 13-15 (1981).
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 292-293 (1981);
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979); Cort
v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975). In this case, consideration of
each of these factors plainly demonstrates that Congress intended the unique right created by § 36(b) to be enforced
solely by the SEC and security holders of the investment
company.
As we have previously noted, Congress adopted the Investment Company Act of 1940 because of its concern with
not mean, however, that all suits brought on behalf of a corporation are I
derivative. The "on behalf" language in § 36(b) indicates only that the
right asserted by a shareholder suing under the statute is a "right of the
corporation"-a proposition confirmed by other aspects of the action: The
fiduciary duty imposed on advisers by § 36(b) is owed to the company itself
as well as its shareholders and any recovery obtained in a§ 36(b) action will
go to the company rather than the plaintiff. SeeS. Rep. No. 91-184, p. 6
(1970); § 36(b)(3). In this respect, a § 36(b) action is undeniably "derivative" in the broad sense of that word. See supra, at 4. As we have
noted, however, Rule 23.1 applies by its terms only to "a derivative action
brought by one or more shareholders ... to enforce a right of a corporation
[when] the corporation [has] failed to enforce a right which may properly
be asserted by it" (emphasis added). The legislative history of § 36(b)
makes clear that Congress intended the perhaps unique "right of a corporation" established by § 36(b) to be asserted by the company's security holders and not by the company itself. Infra, at 12-17.

'

.
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"the potential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment companies." Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 480
(1979). Unlike most corporations, an investment company is
typically created and managed by a pre-existing external
organization known as an investment adviser. Id., at 481.
Because the adviser generally supervises the daily operation
of the fund and often selects affiliated persons to serve on the
company's board of directors, the "relationship between investment advisers and mutual funds is fraught with potential
conflicts of interest." Ibid., quoting Galfand v. Chestnutt
Corp., 545 F. 2d 807, 808 (CA2 1976). In order to minimize
such conflicts of interests, Congress established a scheme
that regulates most transactions between investment companies and their advisers, 15 U. S. C. §80a-17; limits the number of persons affiliated with the adviser who may serve on
the fund's board of directors, §80a-10; and requires that fees
for investment advice and other services be governed by a
written contract approved both by the directors and the
shareholders of the fund, § 80a-15.
In the years following passage of the Act, investment companies enjoyed enormous growth, prompting a number of
studies of the effectiveness of the Act in protecting investors.
One such report, commissioned by the SEC, found that investment advisers often charged mutual funds higher fees
than those charged the advisers' other clients and further determined that the structure of the industry, even as regulated by the Act, had proven resistant to efforts to moderate
adviser compensation. Wharton School Study of Mutual
Funds, H. R. Rep. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pp.
28--30, 34, 66-67 (1962). Specifically, the study concluded
that the unaffiliated directors mandated by the Act were "of
restricted value as an instrument for providing effective
representation of mutual fund shareholders in dealings between the fund and its investment adviser." ld., at 34. A
subsequent report, authored by the SEC itself, noted that investment advisers were generally compensated on the basis
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of a fixed percentage of the fund's assets, rather than on
services rendered or actual expenses. Securities & Exchange Commission, Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, H. R. Rep. No. 89-2337, p. 89 (1966)
(hereinafter SEC Report). The Commission determined
that, as a fund's assets grew, this form of payment could
produce unreasonable fees in light of the economies of scale
realized in managing a larger portfolio. I d., at 94, 102.
Furthermore, the Commission concluded that lawsuits by security holders challenging the reasonableness of adviser fees
had been largely ineffective due to the standards employed
by courts to judge the fees. I d., at 132-143. See infra, at
16 and n. 12.
In order to remedy this and other perceived inadequacies
in the Act, the SEC submitted a series of legislative proposals to Congress that led to the 1970 Amendments to the Act.
Some of the proposals Congress ultimately adopted were intended to make the fund's board of directors more independent of the adviser and to encourage greater scrutiny of
adviser contracts. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §80a-10(a) (requiring that at least 40% of the directors not be "interested
persons," a broader category than the previously identified
group of persons "affiliated" with the adviser, see
§ 80a-2(a)(19)); § 80a-15(c) (requiring independent directors
as well as shareholders to approve adviser contracts); Burks
v. Lasker, supra, 441 U. S., at 482-483. The SEC had,
however, determined that approval of adviser contracts by
shareholders and independent directors could not alone provide complete protection of the interests of security holders
with respect to adviser compensation. See SEC Report,
supra, at 128-131, 144, 146--147. Accordingly, the Commission also proposed amending the Act to require "reasonable"
fees. Id., at 143-147. As initially considered by Congress,
the bill containing this proposal would have empowered the
SEC to bring actions to enforce the reasonableness standard
and to intervene in any similar action brought by or on behalf

'
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of the company. H. R. 9510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §8(d)
(1967); S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1967).
Representatives of the investment company industry, led
by amicus Investment Company Institute (ICI), expressed
concern that enabling the SEC to enforce the fairness of adviser fees might in essence provide the Commission with
rate-making authority. Accordingly, ICI proposed an alternative to the SEC bill which would have provided that actions to enforce the reasonableness standard "be brought
only by the company or a security holder thereof on its behalf." Mutual Fund Legislation of 1967: Hearings on S. 1659
Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, at pp. 100-101 (1967) (hereinafter
1967 Hearings). The version that the Senate finally passed,
however, rejected the industry's suggestion that the investment company itself be expressly authorized to bring suit.
S. 3724, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. §8(d)(6) (1968). Instead, the
Senate bill required a security holder to make demand on the
SEC before bringing suit and provided that, if the Commission refused or failed to bring an action within six months,
the security holder could maintain a suit against the adviser ~
in a "derivative" or representative capacity. Ibid. Like the
original SEC proposal, however, the Senate bill provided
that the SEC could intervene in any action brought by the
company or by a security holder on its behalf. I d., § 22.
After the bill was reintroduced in the 91st Congress, further hearings and consultations with the industry led to the
present version of§ 36(b). SeeS. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 20(b) (1969); 115 Cong. Rec. 13648 (1969) (Statement of Sen.
Mcintyre). The new version adopted "a different method of
testing management compensation." S. Rep. No. 91-184, at
p. 5 (1969). Instead of containing a statutory standard of
"reasonableness," the new version imposed a "fiduciary duty"
on investment advisers. Id., at 5-6. The new bill further
provided that "either the SEC or a shareholder may sue in
court on a complaint that a mutual fund's management fees

-
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involve a breach of fiduciary duty." Id., at 7. The reference in the previous bill to the derivative or representative
nature of the security holder action was eliminated, as was
the earlier provision for intervention by the SEC in actions
brought by the investment company itself. See S. 2224,
supra, §22.
In short, Congress rejected a proposal that would have expressly made the statutory standard governing adviser fees
enforceable by the investment company itself and adopted in
its place a provision containing none of the indications in earlier drafts that the company could bring such a suit. This
legislative history strongly suggests that, in adopting§ 36(b),
Congress did not intend to create an implied right of action in
favor of the investment company.
That conclusion is further supported by the purposes of the
statute. As noted above, the SEC proposed the predecessor
to § 36(b) because of its concern that the structural requirements for investment companies imposed by the Act would
not alone ensure reasonable adviser fees. See supra, at 14.
Indeed, the Commission concluded that the Act's provisions
for independent directors and approval of adviser contracts
had actually frustrated effective challenges to adviser fees.
In particular, the Commission noted that in the three fully litigated cases in which security holders had attacked such fees
under state law, the courts had relied on the approval of adviser contracts by security holders or unaffiliated directors to
uphold the fees. SEC Report, supra, at 132-143. 12 For this
12

In the three cases cited by the SEC, the courts had evaluated the adviser contracts according to common law standards of corporate waste,
under which an unreasonable or unfair fee might be approved unless the
court deemed it "unconscionable" or "shocking." SEC Report, supra, at
142. See Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 54S-549 (D. Colo.
1963); Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 486, 184 A. 2d 602, 610 (1962);
Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A. 2d 720, 723 (1961). Similarly, security holders challenging adviser fees under the Investment Company Act itself had been required to prove gross abuse of trust. See
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reason, the Senate Report proposing the final version of the
statute noted that, while shareholder and directorial approval of the adviser's contract are entitled to serious consideration by the court in a § 36(b) action, "such consideration
would not be controlling in determining whether or not the
fee encompassed a breach of fiduciary duty." S. Rep. No.
91-184, at p. 15 (1969); see id., at p. 5. In contrast to its
approach in other aspects of the 1970 amendments, then,
Congress decided not to rely solely on the fund's directors to
assure reasonable adviser fees, notwithstanding the increased disinterestedness of the board. See Burks v.
Lasker, supra, 441 U. S., at 481-482 n. 10 and 484. See also
SEC Report, supra, at 14&-148 (right of SEC and security
holders to bring actions essential; although role of disinterested directors should be enhanced, "even a requirement
that all of the directors of an externally managed investment
company be persons unaffiliated with the company's adviserunderwriter would not be an effective check on advisory fees
and other forms of management compensation"). This policy
choice strongly indicates that Congress intended security
holder and SEC actions under § 36(b), on the one hand, and
directorial approval of adviser contracts, on the other, to act
as independent checks on excessive fees.
Nor do other factors on which we have relied to identify an
implied cause of action support petitioners' claim that the
right asserted by a shareholder in a§ 36(b) action could be enforced by the investment company. First, investment companies, as well as the investing public, are undoubtedly
within "the class for whose especial benefit" § 36(b) was enacted, Cort v. Ash, supra, 422 U. S., at 78 (emphasis in original), seen. 11, supra. Section§ 36(b)'s express provision for
actions by security holders, however, ensures that, even if
the company's directors cannot bring an action in the fund's
name, the company's rights under the statute can be fully
Brown v. Bullock, 194 F . Supp. 207 (SDNY 1961), aff'd, 294 F. 2d 415
(CA2 1961). See 1967 Hearings, supra, at 117-118.

'

.

82-12~PINION

18

DAILY INCOME FUND, INC. v. FOX

vindicated by plaintiffs authorized to act on its behalf. For
this reason, it is unnecessary to infer a right of action in favor
of the corporation in order to serve the statute's "broad remedial purpose." Cf., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
- - U . S . - - , - (1983). See also Middlesex County
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n.,
supra, 453 U.S., at 13-15. Second, because §36(b) creates
an entirely new right, it was obviously not enacted "in a statutory context in which an implied private remedy [had] already been recognized by the courts." Cf., Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, supra, 456 U. S., at 378;
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, supra, at--. Third,
a corporation's rights against its directors or third parties
with whom it has contracted are generally governed by state,
not federal, law. Burks v. Lasker, supra, 441 U. S., at 478.
See Cort v. Ash, supra, 422 U. S., at 78.
IV

A shareholder derivative action is an exception to the normal rule that the proper party to bring a suit on behalf of a
corporation is the corporation itself, acting through its directors or a majority of its shareholders. Accordingly, Rule
23.1, which establishes procedures designed to prevent minority shareholders from abusing this equitable device, is addressed only to situations in which shareholders seek to enforce a right that "may properly be asserted" by the
corporation itself. In contrast, as the language of§ 36(b) indicates, Congress intended the fiduciary duty imposed on investment advisers by that statute to be enforced solely by security holders of the investment company and the SEC. It
would be anomalous, therefore, to apply a Rule intended to
prevent a shareholder from improperly suing in place of the
corporation to a statute, like § 36(b), conferring a right which
the corporation itself cannot enforce. It follows that Rule
23.1 does not apply to an action brought by a shareholder
under § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act and that the
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plaintiff in such a case need not first make a demand upon the
fund's directors before bringing suit.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Affirmed.
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